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Beneath the Veil of Hope: The effects of EU signaling on foreign investors’ 
sensitivity to corruption before and after EU membership 
 
The litereature on the effects of corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) does not 
point to a conclusive causal logic. Some studies show that high corruption discourages FDI since 
it is perceived as an additional tax on doing business. Others suggest that it is irrelevant and other 
factors matter more. Still others argue that it can actually help FDI since it “greases the wheels” 
of the system. Looking at the relationship between corruption and FDI in the context of the 12 
countries which joined the EU  in 2004-07 one can make a puzzeling observation (Chart 1). 
During the pre-accession phase, despite the fact that corruption control was poor over long 
periods, FDI kept steadily increasing. Post-membership, however, deteriorating corruption 
control was punished by foreign investors and corruption and FDI were more closely correlated. 
Why did investors shift from disregarding it to being sensitive to it? In light of the established 
effect of EU signaling on investor confidence in CEE (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Gray, 2009), I 
hypothesize that (1) positive signaling during the pre-accession process trumped other important 
factors for FDI, such as corruption; (2) these factors then resurfaced after membership was 
granted (and signaling was over) and had the expected impact on investor confidence.
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Chart 1: Corruption Control and FDI in the 12 countries that joined the EU in 2004-07 
 
                                                 
1
 The slowdown (or lack of growth) of FDI after accession is unlikely to be the result of saturation effects, the 
possibility that the majority of the opportunities are already captured and there in little more room for investment. 
For example, in spite of the large stock of FDI that has entered CEE to date, on a per capita basis this stock is in fact 
not great when compared with other European nations or the EU’s average. Only Malta and Cyprus have FDI stock 
per capita that is higher than the EU’s average. For more information, see Appendix C (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development).  
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Correlation coefficient before accession: 0.02. Correlation coefficient after accession 0.22. 
(World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development) 
 
I base this intuition on works on institutional signaling and cognitive psychology. Julia 
Gray (2009) shows that signaling alone, rather than real policy reform, can account for increased 
investor confidence when looking at spreads on sovereign debt. I use this argument and extend it 
by suggesting that (1) positive signaling can also mask slow (or insufficient) reform and (2) once 
signaling is over, investor guidebook consideration again become important for economic 
decision makers and they punish countries that lag behind or backslide. In other words, when 
signaling is gone, real performance matters. In constructing these arguments I also refer to the 
literature on how inferential shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, help people process 
complicated information and navigate uncertainty (e.g. as the one prevalent in information-
scarce environments like the non-OECD countries) (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002). 
Despite its numerous practical uses, the availability heuristic may cause decision-makers to 
overestimate the significance of events that tend to be particularly memorable or vivid, such as a 
positive endorsement by a powerful international institution like the EU. This may in turn affect 
their risk-versus-reward calculus and make them less risk-averse.  
To test my hypotheses I use a mixed method approach. First, I run a time-series analysis 
covering data from 1996 to 2011 to establish that corruption did not have a significant impact on 
FDI before accession but did afterwards. Then, I present the results of an expert survey and a 
brief case study to demonstrate how signaling caused investors to be less risk-averse prior to EU 
membership by activating a specific psychological mechanisms, namely the availability 
heuristic. There are two main contributions that I make to the literatures on international 
institutions, FDI, and corruption. First, I show that corruption matters for FDI differently in 
different contexts and while it has a clear negative effect when rational guidebook principles 
dominate decision-making, its significance could be muted by positive signaling by international 
institutions, such as the EU.  Second, I suggest that cognitive shortcuts, such as the availability 
heuristic, help explain foreign investor’s behavior when investors operate in information-scarce 
environments as they tend to assign disproportionate weight to signals perceived as legitimate. 
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The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, I review the literatures on EU 
integration and FDI and corruption and FDI and explain how my arguments and findings 
contribute to both. Second, I outline the theoretical background informing my hypotheses. Third, 
I explain my methodological approach, discuss some of the difficulties associated with it, and 
present the results from the time series analysis, the survey, and the case study.  I end by 
summarizing my contributions to the academic literatures on FDI, EU signaling, and corruption 
 
EU accession, corruption, and FDI 
 
 By focusing on corruption and progress towards EU accession, this article contributes to 
the wide literature on the impact of EU integration on FDI flows. This section outlines the main 
findings in this literature and explains how my arguments fill some of the existing gaps.  
The positive effect of the EU on the quality of the investment climate in a country is 
well-established. Several studies have found that joining the EU has been beneficial for Western 
European countries attracting FDI. Similarly, others have explored the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries and have established that the prospect of membership has led to 
increased FDI inflows. What the literature on EU integration and FDI has not addressed so far is 
whether FDI flows to new member states continue to be influenced by the same drivers after 
accession as the ones that mattered before. Numerous challenges associated with the legacy of 
communism (corruption, state ownership, less stable banking sector) suggest that the dynamic in 
Eastern Europe, once EU leverage and signaling are gone, can make these countries more 
susceptible to regression or slowdown. If this is true, foreign investors in the region should have 
a higher threshold of fundamental justifications for their decisions after accession. No academic 
study so far has explored this possibility.  
This section outlines some of the key arguments and findings about the effects of 
European integration on FDI in Western Europe. After the foundation of the EU, a notable 
increase of intra- and inter-regional FDI flows was observed among the member countries. Barry 
(2002), for example, shows that Ireland has experienced a significant FDI boom after its EU 
accession in 1973. In this study he traces how a number of US-based MNCs have chosen Ireland 
as their starting point to expand in Europe. He further demonstrates that FDI has contributed to 
economic growth, better export sector performance, the reduction of unemployment, and the 
development of the high-tech sector. Similarly, Barrios (2002) investigates the effects of EU 
integration on the Spanish economy since its accession in 1986 and calls this story the “Spanish 
Economic Miracle”. He finds that the high FDI inflows resulting from the EU integration process 
have been responsible for the strong economic performance of the country. Galego (2002) makes 
a similar contribution to the literature showing that Austria, Finland and Sweden, who joined the 
EU in 1995, have since also became more attractive to foreign investors and are actually the 
main destination for FDI in the EU. Importantly, these studies are confined to the Western 
European context, explore only the effect of membership rather than the process of accession, 
and claim that membership brings more FDI to new members. My study suggests that 
membership in the context of the 5
th
 enlargement may have actually raised the bar for FDI in 
CEE from the perspective of investors.  
Many authors have also researched the effects of the EU integration process on FDI flows 
into CEE candidate countries. While these are more directly related to the research question this 
study poses, they have focused mainly on the accession process, rather than to what happens 
after membership. Bevan and Estrin (2000), for example, specifically analyze the impact of the 
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early accession process on FDI flows into the CEE countries and find out that the Essen Council 
announcement (1994) was associated with a significant increase of FDI received by the three 
most likely candidates for EU accession (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic). Similarly, 
Claessens, Oks and Polastri (1998) examined capital flows to 21 transition countries over the 
1990s and determined that countries that applied for EU membership attracted more FDI. 
Finally, Kaminski (2001) compares FDI inflows between CEE countries and former Soviet 
republics and concludes that the possibility of and progression towards EU accession explains 
the high level of divergence in FDI inflows between these groups. Although these studies do not 
address the effect of EU membership on FDI in CEE, they clearly demonstrate that signaling 
during the accession period is key to FDI inflows. My study confirms this finding by focusing on 
a longer period (1996 to 2011), but also takes this a step further and argues that signaling may 
cause investors to temporarily discount other important factors through the availability heuristic.  
 Finally, my arguments also contribute to the literature on the effects of corruption on 
FDI. The level of corruption in the host country has been introduced as one factor among the 
determinants of FDI location since it is perceived as a source of uncertainty and an additional 
cost of doing business or a tax on profits (Al-Sadiq, 2009; Bardhan, 1997). Thus, countries with 
lower corruption attract more per capita FDI (Abed and Davoodi, 2000). An array of other 
studies confirm this finding (Wei and Wu, 2001; Lambsdorff and Cornelius, 2000; and Wei, 
2000). Importantly, corruption also discourages FDI indirectly by adversely affecting other 
conditions that matter for investors. It has a negative effect on the level of investment and 
economic growth (Mauro, 1995), on the quality of infrastructure and productivity of public 
investment (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997), on income inequality (Li, Xu and Zou, 2000), and on 
health care and education services (Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson, 2000). All those factors affect 
investors' perceptions of stability and profitability, thus making them less likely to engage in FDI 
activity.  
Nevertheless, several studies fail to confirm the claim that corruption affects FDI 
negatively. Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Akcay (2001) find no evidence of a negative 
relationship between corruption and FDI. Wheeler and Mody combined corruption with 12 other 
indicators to form a latent variable and Akcay focused only on developing countries. Given these 
differences in their methodological approach, it is not surprising why their results were different. 
My study contributes to the debate on the effects of corruption on FDI, by introducing an 
argument as to when it may and when it may not matter, thus providing a more nuanced view to 
the question.  
There has been plenty of work on how the EU affects FDI levels for acceding members 
and how corruption affects FDI in general. However, no study has so far attempted to evaluate 
whether EU signaling can mute the effect of corruption temporarily, but then allow it to resurface 
as markets realize that the EU’s pre-accession process has not addressed the problem in a 
systemic way. It is this main argument that I contribute to the literatures on EU enlargement, FDI 
and corruption.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 This section explores the theory behind institutional signaling from which I derive my 
hypotheses about the differential effect of corruption on FDI before and after accession. It is 
organized in three parts. First, I briefly explain how joining an international institution increases 
investor confidence by reducing uncertainty. Then, I review some of the social and cognitive 
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psychology literature on how signaling affects behavior and explain why certain signaling may 
sometimes lead to overconfidence. Third, I explain how the EU’s eastern enlargement is a 
particularly good test case for examining whether positive signaling can mute the importance of 
other factors, such as corruption.  
 A lot of the literature on international institutions claims that they can reduce uncertainty 
(Axelrod, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001; Morrow, 1994; North, 
1990). The main argument in these studies is that by imposing rules and requirements, 
international institutions regularize members' future behavior resulting in more predictable 
interactions between members. Similarly, institutions increase the costs of non-compliance as 
violations of commitments damage a country’s reputation and make further cooperation difficult 
or impossible (Abbott and Snidal, 2000, 427; Simmons, 2000, 594). Therefore, it will not be 
surprising if investors respond positively to positive signals regarding candidate countries' 
progress towards joining an institution like the EU. Moreover, EU conditionality covers an array 
of economic issues that can make the investment climate in these countries more stable and 
predictable, thus strengthening investor trust even more. In this way, good news about countries 
closing chapters and moving forward encourages investors. In their attempt to capture a first-
mover advantage and be ahead of the competition, they may then pay less attention to certain 
fundamentals (e.g. progress against corruption).  
This is also consistent with a strand in the cognitive and social psychology literature 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002) which argues 
that actors rely on inferential shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, to streamline the 
processing of overabundant information and navigate uncertainty. The availability heuristic 
causes people to assign disproportionately higher weight to events that tend to be particularly 
striking or vivid, such as the positive signaling of a powerful international institution like the EU, 
and to overestimate their significance, especially if others are doing it too. The prominent 
example of this heuristic is how drivers react to seeing an accident. In this moment the inferential 
logic of bounded rationality activates, and they slow down. Based on limited but vivid data they 
exaggerate the statistical likelihood of crashing and conform to the appropriate speed limit. As 
time passes and no more car crashes are observed, the drivers’ comprehensive rationality kicks 
back in and provides a more accurate estimate of the probability of an accident, causing them to 
speed up again. Similarly, faced with a decision-theoretic problem, investors in the pre-accession 
stage assigned a greater (than warranted) weight to announcements by the EU which enjoyed 
high levels of publicity and perceived credibility. With positive signaling out of the picture in the 
post-accession period, the return of comprehensive rational analysis meant that investors would 
then once again pay due attention to all factors that should matter for their decisions (e.g. 
corruption).  
 At the same time, in information-scarce environments, such as non-OECD countries, 
markets pay special attention to events that can be “easily and uniformly interpreted,” visible 
acts, such as joining an international institution (Gray, 2009; Rodrik, 1989). Bordo and Rockoff 
(1996) argue that signing onto the gold standard in the nineteenth century served as an 
endorsement for developing countries. Moreover, the authors show that markets validated close 
shadowing of the standard almost as much as actual adherence to it. This implies that policy 
change influenced investors less than nominal membership (Gray, 2009). Thus, one could 
speculate that it may have been possible for investors to be less concerned with actual reforms 
than with these countries' "progression" towards the risk-minimizing international institution.  
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 Thinking about corruption in CEE, this may be especially relevant. None of the 31 
chapters of the acquis or the Copenhagen criteria focused explicitly on corruption and 
compliance tends to be the weakest in the areas where no explicit conditionality was applied 
(Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008). Thus, corruption should have been an important factor for 
foreign investors both during the pre-accession process and after. Nevertheless, it is likely that, 
by the logic of the availability heuristic, they might have overlooked its importance, focusing 
instead on the positive signals from the EU allowing countries to advance in their negotiations.  
Julia Gray provides some background to this intuition. She finds that it was not actual policy 
reform that underpinned investor confidence in terms of spreads on sovereign debt, but merely 
positive signaling from the EU. Thus, while some of these countries were perhaps not 
accomplishing enough in terms of corruption control, this was compensated for by their moving 
further along the pre-accession process. Once membership was granted, real performance 
regained its relevance and centrality. There are, of course, many other factors that could account 
for this investor behavior. Lower labor costs before accession and rising wages after, the 
financial crisis of 2008, or lack of reform in other areas certainly also played a part in first 
encouraging and then discouraging investors after accession. My research design, however, 
controls for the independent effects of these factors and isolates the unique effect of corruption. 
 In terms of case selection, the 5
th
 enlargement is a particularly appropriate setting for 
examining the effect of institutional signaling on investor confidence. First, although these 
countries had different levels of wealth and economic conditions in the 1990s, they all (except 
Cyprus and Malta) emerged from planned economies and needed to undertake a similar set of 
policy reforms around the same time (Pridham, 2005). Secondly, given that they all represented 
poorer and politically diverse countries, convinced of the economic necessity EU membership, 
the EU was able to exercise a stronger and more comprehensive conditionality on them as 
opposed to previous rounds (Vachudova, 2005) adding credibility to its signaling. Last, Brussels 
applied ex ante conditionality to the aspiring states and monitored their progress closely by 
publicly assessing their efforts (Vachudova, 2005). Thus, the eastern enlargement constitutes a 
convenient framework to test whether signaling can sometimes cause investors to discount 
otherwise important factors, such as corruption.  
 At the same time it is possible that it is exactly because of the “asymmetrical 
interdependence” between the CEE countries and the EU that EU signaling may have been 
perceived as more powerful than it would be in other contexts. There was hardly any aspect of 
public or private life that remained untouched during the conditionality period. Total overhaul is 
not easy in an environment of falling incomes, weak institutional capacity, and insufficient 
familiarity with modern practices. In such a difficult and all-encompassing effort, it was 
inevitable that the CEECs would falter in some aspects of reform – and it therefore made sense 
to seek the expert help of the EU. For example, Bulgaria, which experienced a hyperinflation 
crisis in 1996-97 decided to implement a currency board and deliberately surrender the conduct 
of monetary policy to the Bundesbank and, later, the European Central Bank. The point here is 
that countries not undergoing complete systemic change may be less in need of EU help and 
expertise and therefore less responsive to EU conditionality than the CEECs were. In such cases 
EU signaling may not represent such a meaningful endorsement to a country’s progress. To 
control for this possibility, I also include Cyprus and Malta in my study since they were applying 
at the same time as the CEECs, yet they were not undergoing complete systemic change.   
In terms of the time-period of this analysis it is likely that risk was perceived as declining 
during the entire candidacy period, as Brussels made clear public assessments whether a 
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candidate's policy reforms in various areas conformed to EU standards. Signaling by the EU 
served as reliable public information in an information-scarce environment. When a country's 
progress got validated by the Commission, this translated into a big decrease in perceived risk. 
Investors stopped viewing these countries as emerging markets but as stable OECD countries, 
regardless of the fact that their levels of development might have been the same as before (Gray, 
2009). This suggests that markets may pay less attention to the actual reform course than to EU 
pronouncements on it (Gray, 2009). The universal availability of this information and the 
credibility of its source were considered enough for investors to make more confident choices.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
This section outlines the institutional specifics of the pre-accession period in the context 
of the EU’s ability to convey credible signals. The EU’s influence varied across the different 
stages of conditionality but the inclusion of a country in the “credible candidate” stage was 
perhaps the first credible enough signal. During the next stage, the negotiation phase, the EU and 
the candidate country agree that the rules pertaining to a specific chapter have been transposed 
and the EU announces this publicly. Studies on signaling in diplomacy (Fearon, 1994) have 
shown that states act in a way to reveal information about their “type” to international audiences 
in order to enhance their credibility in diplomatic relations. Thus, by cooperating with the 
Commission and working diligently to close the chapters, CEE governments also signal that they 
could be trusted in the future. Thus, in light of the concrete signals that publically deeming a 
country a credible candidate and announcing its progression along the chapters of the acquis 
constitute, I propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Positive signaling during the entire pre-accession period overrides otherwise 
important guidebook considerations for foreign investors, including corruption. 
 
  Upon the successful conclusion of the negotiations and the ratification of the Treaty of 
Accession, a country becomes a full-fledged member of the EU.  This is the end of signaling as 
the granting of membership signifies the full incorporation of the given country into the 
economic and political structures of the EU. While this means that political risk is now at its 
lowest relative point, the leverage of the EU to demand further reforms is more limited. Since 
investors at this point could not reasonably hope for institutional improvement of the same scale 
and pace, they now return to their rational guidebook style of evaluating whether investments 
should or should not be made. In light of this intuition, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: After membership, investor guidebook principles, such as corruption, resurface as 
important. Corruption control has a positive effect on FDI inflows.  
 
Methodology 
 
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, I outline the way the dependent variable, 
FDI inflows, the independent variables of interest, the stages of the EU accession process and 
corruption, and all the relevant control variables have been operationalized. Then, I present the 
findings of the statistical analysis, explain the results, discuss their robustness, and analyze the 
mechanisms behind them.  
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FDI inflows 
 
This study defines the dependent variable as the annual FDI inflows from 1996 to 2011. 
This is the sum of every year’s new direct investments in a given “host” country by foreign 
capital owners. The measure of FDI inflows comes from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development
2
: “An investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a 
lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an 
economy other than of the investor. The direct investor´s purpose is to exert a significant degree 
of influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other economy. FDI involves 
both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them 
and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. FDI may be undertaken 
by individuals, as well as business entities.”3 The data is expressed in 2011 US dollars.  
 
Corruption 
 
In order to specify corruption, I refer to the Control of Corruption (CC) index, which is 
part of the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI). Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(KKM), who have developed the index, define CC as an index “capturing perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests” (KKM, 2008, p.8). 
Per the existing literature, higher levels of corruption are associated with perceptions of greater 
political risk and lead to less FDI. Wei (2000), Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Voyer and 
Beamish (2004) all find a statistically significant negative relationship between corruption and 
FDI inflows.  
 
EU Signaling 
 
As discussed previously there are several reasons to expect that positive EU signaling in 
terms of progress towards accession matters for attracting FDI. First, entrance in to the EU 
means free access to the Single European Market, the largest commercial market in the world. 
Second, it means access to a cheaper but skilled labor force. Third, accession will reduce risk by 
providing more macro-economic, political, institutional, and legal stability. Thus, studies (Bevan, 
Estrin and Grabbe, 2001; Gray, 2009) have confirmed that announcements of progress towards 
EU accession have had an impact on investors’ attitudes towards these countries.  
To operationalize EU signaling, I assigned conditionality dummies to the 12 Eastern 
Enlargement countries in accordance with the stages outlined above. A country receives a 1 for 
the “credible candidate” stage if it has signed an association agreement with the EU but has not 
yet entered accession negotiations; it receives a 0 otherwise. The “accession negotiations” 
dummy assigns a 1 to countries that have begun accession negotiations but not yet signed a 
Treaty of Accession, and 0 otherwise. Finally, there is no “membership” dummy since the 
second statistical design includes only the years in which all 12 countries have already become 
members. The conditionality dummies are based on the table below. 
                                                 
2
 Developing countries look favorably upon UNCTAD, and these data are least affected by intentional non-reporting 
3
 http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Foreign-Direct-Investment-FDI.aspx (accessed on July 21, 
2014). 
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Table 1: Stages of Conditionality and When They Applied to Particular Countries 
 
Stage Candidate Country and Period 
Credible Candidate Bulgaria 1996-99, Cyprus 1996-97, Czech Republic 1996-97, 
Estonia 1996-97, Hungary 1996-97, Latvia 1996-99, Lithuania 
1996-99, Malta 1998-99, Poland 1996-97, Romania 1996-99, 
Slovakia 1996-99, Slovenia 1996-97 
Accession Negotiations Bulgaria 2000—04, Cyprus 1998--04, Czech Republic 1998--04, 
Estonia 1998--04, Hungary 1998--04, Latvia 2000--04, Lithuania 
2000--04, Malta 2000--04, Poland 1998--04, Romania 2000-04, 
Slovakia 2000-04, Slovenia 1998-04 
Full Membership Bulgaria 2007-12, Cyprus 2004-12, Czech Republic 2004-12, 
Estonia 2004-12, Hungary 2004-12, Latvia 2004-12, Lithuania 
2004-12, Malta 2004-12, Poland 2004-12, Romania 2007-12, 
Slovakia 2004-12, Slovenia 2004-12 
 
Alternative Explanations 
 
The literature on FDI has identified a number of relevant variables affecting FDI into 
transition economies. These include an array of indicators concerning the health and stability of 
the economy and the political system: market size, openness of the economy, inflation, foreign 
reserves, government spending, unit labor costs, and structural reforms providing for a free and 
predictable investment climate.  These alternative explanations are incorporated in the analysis.  
  
Host market size 
 
Host market size is important for FDI for two distinct reasons. First, it can enable 
investors to capture potential economies of scale in terms of production (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; 
Buethe and Milner, 2008; Ang, 2008). Secondly, firms can be drawn to bigger markets in search 
of new market opportunities and consumers (Lankes and Venables, 1996). I operationalize host 
market size using the World Bank’s GDP index (converted into US dollars). 
 
Trade Openness 
 
Trade openness is another factor that influences FDI in that investors often seek to 
produce for other markets and/or need to import raw or materials for their production from 
abroad (Caves, 1996; Singh and Jun, 1995). In that sense the presence of tariff or non-tariff 
barriers to trade can be detrimental for FDI and FDI and openness of the economy will be 
positively related. I operationalize trade openness as the percent change in volume of imports in 
a given year (Bevan and Estrin, 2000). The measure comes from the World Bank database.  
 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
Inflation and foreign reserves also influence FDI (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Jimborean and 
Kelber, 2011) as low inflation and high reserves signify macroeconomic stability. To 
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operationalize these variables I refer to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Thus, I 
define inflation as percent change in annual average consumer prices and reserves as total 
reserves including gold and denominated in current USD.  
 
Government Spending 
 
Levels of government spending also affects FDI in that in an attempt to attract FDI 
governments decrease levels of capital taxation which leads to less government spending 
(Jensen, 2006). While there is mixed evidence on this intuition, many studies include this 
control. I operationalize government spending as the percent change in government total 
expenditure (World Bank).  
 
Unit Labor Cost 
 
Profitability from the perspective of foreign investors is intrinsically connected to unit 
labor costs (Holland and Pain, 1998). Access to an affordable labor, exhibiting high levels of 
skill and training and a solid scientific base (EBRD, 1999), is considered a fundamental 
comparative advantage of the region (Maeyer, 2006; Bevan and Estrin, 2000). Importantly, 
investors are attracted to cheap labor only if it is not crowded out by lower productivity or an 
overvalued currency. Thus, I include gross average wages, denominated in US Dollars, as 
indexed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.  
 
Structural Reforms 
 
Another possible alternative explanation is that markets simply respond to policy reform 
by governments and not merely EU signaling. During the negotiations phase of conditionality, 
many countries underwent stringent periods of policy reform in order to qualify for membership 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Therefore, increasing FDI may be just a function of the 
introduction of or perceived effectiveness of a reform (Forbes, 2006; Campos and Kinoshita, 
2008), rather than merely signaling.  
To assess the role of reforms I use several EBRD reform indexes, which I average out: 
large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, 
competition policy, price liberalization, and trade and forex reform. Importantly these measures 
reflect the degree of reform and not necessarily its effectiveness. The degree being important in 
its own right, I take additional steps to isolate the effect of structural reforms on the investment 
climate.  
The investment freedom index produced by the Heritage Foundation seems particularly 
relevant in terms of how reforms have affected the investment environment of a country.
4
 The 
index is based on several assumptions: “In an economically free country, there would be no 
constraints on the flow of investment capital. Individuals and firms would be allowed to move 
their resources into and out of specific activities, both internally and across the country’s borders, 
                                                 
4
 The Heritage Foundation produces the index based on information from a variety of sources including the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 2010–2013; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Country 
Commercial Guide, 2010–2013. 
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without restriction. Such an ideal country would receive a score of 100 on investment freedom.”5 
In reality countries impose an array of restrictions to investment behavior and the index takes 
many of them into account: investment restrictions based on nationality, burdensome foreign 
investment code in terms of transparency and bureaucratic structures, restrictions on land 
ownership, various sectoral restrictions or barriers, commonality of expropriations of investment 
without due compensation, foreign exchange controls, capital controls in terms of instances of 
repatriation of profits or need for government approval for various transactions. These are all 
factors that cater directly to the quality of the investment environment both in terms of its legal 
underpinning and its practical suitability.  
In addition to these specific indicators of degree and practice of reforms, some studies 
have also suggested an alternative method to evaluate the effectiveness of reform. They include 
macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation, as proxies for reform given that they represent an 
economic reality that is directly the result of government policy choices or lack thereof. Such 
economic indicators are already present in my models.  
 
The Financial Crisis 
 
The credit crunch and recession that ensued coincided with a collapse of FDI inflows to 
CEE. In 2009, FDI inflows to the CEE region were 50% lower than in 2008 (Economic Review, 
PriceWaterHouseCooper, 2010). In order to control for the independent adverse effects on FDI 
inflows generated by the financial crisis of 2008, I employ two strategies. First, I include a 
control variable for every country for every year measuring the presence and magnitude of the 
crisis. The variable comes from the Luc Leaven and Fabian Valencia (2012) dataset which 
covers the universe of systemic banking crises for the period 1970-2012, and also includes data 
on the resolution and fiscal and economic costs of banking crises. Second, I include a measure 
for global FDI inflows for every year, thus accounting for the global-level fluctuations of FDI, 
which are profoundly affected by financial crises, such as the one of 2008. The inclusion of these 
variables in the time series controls for the negative effect of the financial crisis on FDI inflows.  
 
Time Series Analysis 
 
The statistical part of this article utilizes a time-series cross-sectional regression analysis 
to examine the effect of EU signaling before and after accession on investor confidence in in the 
12 countries of the 5
th
 enlargement. Data on FDI inflows and a number of variables which may 
affect them are available over the period 1996-2011. Pooled time-series datasets such as this one 
introduce great challenges for researchers. The presence of relationships within countries and in 
particular time periods means that there will be serial correlation among observations (as 
confirmed by the Woolridge test), as well as structure in the error terms. To tackle 
autocorrelation (and any other unspecified spurious correlation) I employ two methods. First, I 
include a lagged dependent variable in both the pre- and post-accession models (Keele and 
Kelly, 2006; Beck and Katz, 2011).
6
 Additionally, I utilize panel-corrected standard errors to 
reduce the possibility for biased standard errors and inefficient estimates resulting from 
contemporaneous correlation across units and unit level heteroskedastisity (Beck and Katz, 
                                                 
5
 http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology (accessed on July 23, 2014). 
6
 In addition to addressing this methodological challenge, including a lagged FDI is theoretically justified since 
researchers have consistently found FDI to be self-reinforcing (Wheeler and Mody 1992). 
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1995). To cross-validate the results of this approach I also use Prais-Winsten transformations, 
which allow for estimations in the presence of auto-correlated errors, again with panel-corrected 
standard errors. Finally, I also include a fixed effects model as an additional method to control 
for potential structural issues in the dataset. The main substantive results are consistent across 
estimations which serves as a robustness check for the findings. Additionally, the findings do not 
change under bootstrapping and jack-knifing.
7
 Table 1 below presents the results of the six 
quantitative models.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Using subsets of available data (jackknifing) or drawing randomly with replacement from a set of data points 
(bootstrapping) produces estimates of the precision of coefficients. 
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Table 2: FDI Drivers Before and After EU Accession 
 
Models A (pre-accession) and D (post-accession) are LDV regressions with panel-corrected 
standard errors; models B (pre-accession) and E (post-accession) are Prais-Winsten regressions 
with panel-corrected standard errors; models C (pre-accession) and F (post-accession) are Fixed 
Effects models. ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .10. One-tailed test where appropriate. 
 
The results of all the LDV, the Prais-Winsten, and FE models confirm the hypotheses that 
corruption control has a positive and significant effect on FDI after accession but is insignificant 
before, when EU signaling is a strong (the strongest) predictor of FDI inflows. A number of 
 Before Accession After Accession 
Drivers Model A 
LDV 
Model B 
Prais-
Winsten 
Model C 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model D 
LDV 
Model E 
Prais-
Winsten 
Model F 
Fixed Effects 
Lagged FDI 
.210 
(.258) 
 -.123 
(.178) 
.427*** 
(.180) 
 .189** 
(.101) 
Credible 
Candidate  
1342.716*** 
(365.209) 
1260.529*** 
(325.051) 
1380.85** 
(712.937) 
 
 
  
Accession 
Negotiations 
1145.011*** 
(194.969) 
952.090*** 
(205.957) 
992.047** 
(551.348) 
   
Corruption 
Control 
147.773 
(348.738) 
-170.028 
(370.491) 
330.821 
(1057.837) 
3179.355*** 
(987.865) 
4007.583** 
(1789.634) 
3695.363* 
(2698.353) 
Structural 
Reform 
38.169* 
(24.164) 
59.410** 
(28.582) 
107.362 
(98.777) 
-69.024 
(101.140)  
-87.496 
(142.060)   
-57.682 
(351.086) 
Investment 
Climate  
7.010 
(11.991) 
18.961** 
(10.393) 
1.611 
(21.799) 
-52.689** 
(24.949)      
-83.627** 
(39.419)      
.373 
(51.409) 
Market Size -.276 
(1.645) 
.339 
(2.338) 
-11.484 
(50.741) 
-4.678 
(3.921)     
-9.732** 
(5.222)  
-4.714 
(16.668) 
Trade 
Openness 
.803 
(10.220) 
-8.347 
(6.840) 
-3.277 
(12.038) 
25.862** 
(13.677)      
27.163** 
(10.778)      
44.013*** 
(18.243) 
Inflation 2.010 
(2.091) 
2.486** 
(1.300) 
-.129 
(9.908) 
-.972 
(1.272)    
-1.374 
(1.348)   
-6.794** 
(3.505) 
Reserves 1.530** 
(6.860) 
1.960*** 
(3.960) 
1.560 
(8.710) 
9.760*** 
(3.900)  
1.380*** 
(3.680)  
-2.510 
(3.680) 
Unit Labor 
Costs 
-.220 
(.473) 
-.329 
(.432) 
.702 
(1.742) 
-2.303*** 
(.534) 
-3.084*** 
(.732) 
-4.670*** 
(1.953) 
Government 
Spending 
-7.890 
(9.742) 
-21.741** 
(10.773) 
-17.605 
(38.639) 
-51.252** 
(22.779) 
-77.645*** 
(32.850) 
-43.316 
(54.503) 
Global FDI .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
-2.470 
(.001) 
.002*** 
(001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
004*** 
(.001) 
Financial 
Crisis 
767.455 
(1023.969) 
453.752 
(437.931) 
-302.200 
(864.3414) 
-494.907 
(666.477) 
-82.174 
(874.730) 
1839.152 
(1235.37) 
Constant -2876.364** 
(1308.769) 
-3829.83*** 
(1093.076) 
-3625.707 
(6409.586) 
8065.217 
(4276.881) 
11962.01** 
(6207.93) 
7752.874 
(14473.02) 
R-squared 77 83 13 75 61 36 
Wald Chi2 355.42 834.31  491.46 85.55  
Number of 
Observations 
72 80 72 95 95 95 
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other important factors for investors, including trade openness and unit labor costs, exhibit the 
same relationship – insignificant, while the countries were applying to the EU and were 
receiving positive endorsements from the EU about their progress, and significant after 
membership, when signaling was no longer present, and investors no longer felt that they can 
discount guidebook principles in the short-run in the name of a more hopeful promise for the 
future.  
The results from the pre-accession models provide some evidence of how the availability 
heuristic might have affected investors’ attitudes and decision making in this period. Looking at 
the more restrictive LDV and FE models one can see that while most investor guidebook 
considerations are insignificant in the pre-accession period, EU signaling in both the “credible 
candidate stage” and during the “accession negotiations” had positive and significant effects on 
investor confidence. All three model specifications focusing on this time period demonstrate that 
positive signaling inspired investor confidence to an extent that overshadowed a wide array of 
other considerations that should theoretically matter (trade openness, market size, wages).  
There are a few other insights based on the LDV and Prais-Winsten models worth 
mentioning. First, both return significant results for foreign reserves. Expectedly, ceteris paribus 
higher foreign reserves served as ground for greater investor confidence in the macroeconomic 
resilience of a country and encouraged more FDI inflows. One can also notice that the two 
models provide some evidence that structural reforms mattered in the pre-accession period. 
Expectedly, to the extent that the degree of reforms, as defined by the EBRD, affected investors, 
these effects were positive and FDI increased as a result of the introduction of the various 
structural reforms.
8
 Last, the pre-accession Prais-Winsten model also provides some support for 
the conjecture that increased government spending would have a negative effect on FDI inflows. 
The results from the post-accession models add further insights into the psychological 
state of foreign investors making decisions in evolving investment environments. With EU 
signaling no longer available to help investors filter information, channel inferences, and form 
(positive) expectations, the natural biases and distortions that come with the availability heuristic 
are now gone. Traditional guidebook approaches to investment, based on comprehensive 
rationality rather than bounded rationality, resurface in this time period and a great number of 
theoretically relevant FDI drivers again become significant. Greater openness to trade, higher 
reserves, lower government spending, lower wages, and notably, better corruption control (p < 
0.10 in the FE model), each lead to more FDI inflows, all else equal. These variables come with 
signs and levels of statistical significance consistent with theory and prior studies.
9
  
 
                                                 
8
 Large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, 
price liberalization, and trade and forex reform. 
9
 Interestingly, the variable estimating the friendliness of the investment climate comes with a negative sign and is 
also statistically significant. The index (investment freedom), produced by the Heritage Foundation, deals with 
issues, such as restrictions based on nationality, expropriations of property without due compensation, and various 
capital and exchange rate controls. One interpretation would be that in the post-accession period most of these 
considerations have been addressed to a satisfactory degree in the context of the Single Market. If so, attempts at 
further liberalizations, perhaps to capture more FDI, may at this point not be as impressive to investors as other 
factors, such as wages or reserves, both exhibiting very high levels of statistical significance. Thus, for example, if 
we compare the performance of the three least restrictive countries Estonia (average score of 90), Hungary (average 
score 73) and Latvia (average score 73), and the most restrictive one, Bulgaria (average score of 55) in the post 
accession period, one can notice that Bulgaria attracted more FDI than each of the three and it also had lower wages 
(roughly 30% of wages in Estonia and Hungary and 45% of wages in Latvia) and higher reserves.  
15 
 
Survey 
10
 
 
In order to explain how signaling affected the way investors perceived the importance of 
corruption and other factors, I now turn to a discussion of the survey I was able to administer. 
The survey attempts to shed more light into the psychological state of investors and explain to 
what extent corruption mattered and matters for their decisions and affects trends in FDI.  
 
Table 3: FDI in Bulgaria in millions of USD 1996-2012
11
 
 
 
 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-database.aspx, accessed in July 
2014) 
                                                 
10
 Although the results discussed here feature the answers of 32 respondents who are engaged in FDI activity in 
Bulgaria, I also got responses from four businessmen in Cyprus. Their answers suggest the same logic of thinking 
about EU signaling and corruption.  
11
 This trend is generalizable to all 12 countries that joined in 2004-07 as FDI inflows declined post-accession in 
Cyprus 2007, Bulgaria 2007, Latvia 2007, Lithuania 2007, Poland 2007, Romania 2008, Slovenia 2008, Malta 2006, 
Slovakia 2006, Estonia 2005, Hungary 2005, and Czech Republic 2005. Importantly, all but two (Slovenia and 
Romania) of these declines took place soon after these countries’ accessions, but before the financial crisis (Note: 
Slovenia’s and Romania’s FDI as a percent of GDP had actually also started to decrease before the crisis in 2007 
and 2006 respectively). Even in the five cases when the decline is shown to have started in 2007 (also the accession 
year for Bulgaria and Romania), the monthly data on the downward trend in 2007 precede the crisis’s beginning, 
which can be dated  August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas stopped withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a 
complete evaporation of liquidity" (Elliot 2012, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-
blog/2012/aug/05/economic-crisis-myths-sustain). Relatedly, the crisis truly peaked in 2008 and FDI by nature does 
not respond to market trends as instantaneously as the stock market. In the other cases the decline started within one 
or two years after accession and before the crisis. 
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The results of the survey confirm the findings from the regression analysis. They show that 
although corruption mattered for investors both before and after accession, the perceived 
economic and institutional benefits of membership were high on investors’ minds before 
accession and disproportionally affected their decisions. The questions asked focused on two 
broad categories – investors’ attitudes toward corruption before and after accession as an 
important factor for FDI and their susceptibility to EU signaling as a trigger to activating the 
availability heuristic. The survey was administered in person and via email in the summer of 
2013 and featured 32 respondents representing several countries, including the USA, Greece, 
Germany, Austria, and the United Arab Emirates, with investments in core sectors of the 
economy, such as real estate, financial services, communications, agriculture, and retail.
12
 The 
respondents occupied mid and high-level management positions and were involved either in the 
initial investment decision or current decisions about further investments.   
 The first round of questions assesses attitudes towards corruption before and after 
accession. Notwithstanding the limitation that questions like that are prone to "backward" 
misremembering or biased updating, the results reveal an interesting story. The majority of 
respondents confirm that corruption was an important consideration for them both before and 
after EU membership, a finding that should not be surprising, given that Bulgaria and most of the 
other post-communist countries have had on-going problems with corruption control since the 
fall of communism.
13
  
 
                                                 
12
 The sample frame included 54 potential respondents, representing firms with investments in four of the top five 
sectors of the Bulgarian economy (Real Estate (1
st
), Financial Intermediation (2
nd
), Retail (4
th
), and Communications 
(5
th
) as well as four of the top ten investing countries (Austria (2
nd
), Greece (3
rd
), Germany (6
th
), USA (10
th
)). 
Source: US Department of State 2013 Investment Report on Bulgaria. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204610.htm (accessed on January 9, 2015).   
13
 A review of a number of issues of the Global Competitiveness report cross-validates these findings as it shows 
that corruption has consistently been a top 5 or 6 “problematic factor for doing business” in the eight countries that I 
found information on (Czech Republic, Romania, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia) during both 
the accession and post-accession periods (with the exception of Estonia, where it was 8
th
 before and 10
th
 after). The 
Global Competitiveness report is based on the opinions of an average of 98 experts per country representing the 
main sectors of the economy (agriculture, manufacturing industry, non-manufacturing industry, and services). For 
more info: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2011-12/6.GCR2011-2012Chapter1.3EOS.pdf (accessed on July 26, 
2014). 
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The next couple of questions try to establish the current rate and state of these investments and 
ask for the potential reasons for their slowdown or stagnation.  
 
  
   
The results here are interesting. Expectedly, zero participants said that their firm was 
disinvesting or withdrawing since FDI tends to be very sticky (Liebscher 2007). Interestingly, 
however, 24 out of the 25 who said that their investment rate has slowed down or remained the 
same, pointed out coprruption as one of the main reasons for this. In fact these people singled out 
corruption as the most important reason, ahead of “inefficient government bureacracy” (22 
answers) and “access to financing” (20), the main corrolary of the financial crisis of 2008. These 
answers raise an intersting question: If corruption mattered for investment decisions before 
accession just as much as it matters now, and it is a top reason to slow down investment now, 
why did people invest back then? Why was corruption discounted? Could it be the case that as 
much as it mattered, or was supposed to matter, EU-related factors overrrode its relevance?  
1 3 
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 The next set of questions aim to establish investors’ susceptability to signaling as well as 
the rationalized effect of signaling on their behavior. The first four questions attempt to directly 
assess the possibility of behavior having been driven by the availability heuristic. They try to 
answer the question of how signaling affected behavior. 
 
  
 
  
 
 About two-thirds of the respondents did think that they were making the initial decision 
in an information-scarce environment (at least to a certain extent) and more than two-thirds were 
influenced by Bulgaria’s progress towards membership, both constituting necessary conditions 
for the availability heuristic. There are two psychological states that these two answers point at. 
As reform often preceded the actual closure of negotiating chapters, those who felt that their 
access to reliable information was good or adequate (7), saw the EU’s endorsements as credible 
public knowledge and felt encouraged. At the same time those who felt that the information 
environment in a young democracy was uncertain (21), elected not to search for more 
information as comprehensive rationality would entail, but turned to the inferential strategies of 
bounded rationality and perceived the EU signals as fundamental information in its own right. In 
7 
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both cases then investors were affected by signaling, either more than, or as well as by their 
individual (objective) assessment of the actual quality of the investment environment.  
 The other two questions in this section look at other, more obvious aspects of the 
availability heuristic, namely the influence of the behavior of others and the tendency to 
exaggerate the importance of vivid information, such as EU endorsements. Only a small minority 
of investors say that they were influenced by others to a large extent, but half admit that they 
were influenced at least to a certain one. This is not surprising because from an economic 
perspective the CEE countries constituted new markets where a first-mover advantage could be 
crucial. Similarly, from a psychological perspective the (herding) behavior of groups in its own 
right can be seen as legitimating, as evidenced by the wide and growing literature in behavioral 
economics (Banerjee, 1992; Shiller, 1995). Finally, although some investors expectedly refuse to 
admit that they discounted factors other than the EU when making their decision, about two-
thirds says that this might have been the case, though only to a certain extent.  
 The last two questions in this section try to answer the question of why signaling had the 
strong and positive effect it did. When asked why they invested in Bulgaria in the first place, two 
of the top three reasons pointed at have something to do with the EU – predictability from EU 
membership and access to the single market, with low wages being the other important factor. 
Thus, it is evident that although investors say that they cared about everything and they took 
every guidebook factor into account, EU-related factors were high one their minds.  
 
The next question asks about the reasons why the EU announcements had an effect on their 
decision-making.  
20 
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There are a couple of observations worth noticing here. A great majority (24) accepted the EU 
assessments as proof that reforms were happening. Indeed, the accession process was highly 
meritocratic (Vachudova, 2005) and it made sense for investors to take progress as valuable 
information. However, more than a third of these 24 respondents (10) also said that other 
information was not reliable, which means that they did allow the EU signals to trigger the 
availability heuristic, which helps channel information but also creates the risk of significant 
distortions of and biases against other sources of information, such as other fundamentals. 
Finally, more than two-thirds of investors also said that the promise of institutional stability and 
predictability mattered to them, an argument firmly in line with established theories of 
international relations (Keohane, 1984; Morrow, 1994; North, 1990).   
 
Interviews 
 
To supplement the findings from the statistical analysis and the survey I also conducted 
interviews with Greek and American investors who are engaged in FDI activity in Bulgaria. The 
interviews showed that investors did indeed resort to using the inferential shortcuts that the EU 
progress reports provided during the accession period and selectively discounted other 
information in the hope for post-accession appreciation of their assets and more streamlined 
penetration of their services. The interviewees were involved in several sectors of the economy 
including real estate, financial services, construction, agriculture, and energy. All interviewees 
were univocal that the investment environment in the country was uncertain until 1997 as 
Bulgaria had no specific legislation on FDI. In October 1997 the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) 
created the first legal framework for foreign investment which was up to par with accepted 
international standards. This precedent as well as the aggressive privatization reform of the late 
1990s created a fertile ground for investment. One of the companies, a fund of funds, which I 
interviewed, invested a total of $250 million between 1999 and 2006. This company provided me 
with specific data regarding their investments (in thousands of Euros) since 2007.  
 
Table 4: FDI Post-accession of a Fund of Funds 
18 
24 
22 
10 
2 2 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
access to the
single market
assessments
proved reforms
were
happening
institutional
predictability
after
membership
was desirable
other info was
not as reliable
no or little
weight
other
Why did you put weight on the EU announcements on 
Bulgaria's progress to accession?  
21 
 
 
 
One can notice the sharp slowdown of the investment rate following the accession of 
Bulgaria to the EU (2007) and the beginning of the financial crisis (2008). Following the 
hypotheses of this article, I asked about the major investment drivers before accession and the 
main reasons for the slowdown: “It was easier to sell ideas to investors [before accession], both 
because we had the EU accession chip to play and because credit access conditions at home were 
more favorable…Now, even when money is available, the bar is higher and the corruption-
ridden energy sector is raising questions with our investors,” said the manager of this fund which 
manages an array of investments in several sectors (Interview summer 2013). Evidently, before 
accession US investors were eager to invest and were encouraged by the prospect of 
membership. After accession, capitalizing on “hope” was more difficult even if funding was 
available. Thus, in 2008 this fund created a platform that secured €50 million in equity to invest 
in renewable energy projects (solar, wind, geothermal, and hydroelectric). With the money 
secured, however, the project was put on hold due to corruption considerations (amidst otherwise 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals). Such strict due-diligence was not the norm before 
accession when corruption was just as relevant and influential in the Bulgarian market. Since 
2008 the company has slowed down its investment rate, employed less staff, and actively sought 
other sectors of the economy to invest in where predictability is high, barriers to entry low, and 
the government involvement less.  
Such marked change in attitudes towards investing in Bulgaria is not unique to just this 
fund of funds. Twenty-two out of the twenty-five investors I interviewed stated that the prospect 
of EU accession was overwhelmingly more important for their companies than other factors and 
that positive EU announcements encouraged investments. Nineteen defined decision-making 
now using words such as “more structured”, “risk-averse”, “unemotional”, “critical”, “rational”, 
“objective”, “straight-forward”, “cautious”, “programmatic”, and “piecemeal”, alluding to the 
return of the more rational approach to investing in the absence of vivid endorsements 
stimulating the availability heuristic. Importantly, when asked whether they regret investing in 
Bulgaria or feel misled by the EU accession process, again twenty-two said that they had higher 
expectations for corruption control post-accession and that their companies probably 
overinvested in the years leading to membership. This intuition can be corroborated by 
comparing the average FDI inflows in the new EU post-communist members before and after 
accession to the FDI inflows in post-communist countries that have never been part of the 
accession process.  
 
Table 5: FDI in EU and non-EU post-communist countries
14
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The non-EU post-communist countries here are: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Serbia. The time period is 1998-2011.  
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
FDI 44,445 25,533 2,416 1,339 2,086 1,426 300
New EU post-communist member avg Non EU post-communist country avg
Before Accession 5.63 4.74
After Accession 6.48 7.20
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
22 
 
EU applicant countries attracted significantly more FDI as they were moving along the 
accession process (5.63% vs. 4.74%) due to the “EU bump” – the fact that investors anticipated 
economic gains associated with EU membership. Interestingly, however, non-EU post-
communist countries have attracted more FDI (7.20% vs. 6.48%) in the post-accession period 
suggesting that when signaling (and hope) is out of the picture FDI rates in post-communist EU 
members are actually lower than thoese in a peer group with a similar communist legacy.  
Commenting on the change in the investment climate in Bulgaria after its accession, 
some foreign investors have publically singled out corruption as an impediment to their 
operations. Complaining about the business environment in the film industry, David Varod, CEO 
of Nu Boyana Film Studios
15
, recently said that, “Corruption eats the country.” Similarly, Alex 
Nestor, vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Bulgaria, admitted that “The 
investment climate in the country is not something we can be proud of,” when speaking precisely 
of the corruption-ridden energy sector (New York Times, July 7, 2014).
16
  
The interviews, therefore, also provide credence to the notion that before accession 
progress towards the EU encouraged investors and might have caused them to discount or 
overlook otherwise important factors. Similarly, when the hope for further improvements 
decreased after membership as a result of lower EU leverage, other (“more structured”, 
“rational”, and “straight-forward”) factors, and corruption in particular, reemerged as influential 
considerations for FDI.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article shows that corruption has a differential effect on FDI inflows in the countries 
of the 5
th
 enlargement before and after their accession to the EU. The main finding is that when 
the EU sends clear positive signals during the accession period, foreign investors’ confidence 
gets boosted to the extent that they discount an array of fundamental considerations that are 
otherwise important, such as corruption. The situation changes after accession as the EU no 
longer sends such signals. Thus, once a country is part of the bloc, fundamental factors reemerge 
as important and investors may choose to punish countries that are perceived as lagging behind, 
static, or backsliding. There are several contributions that this article makes. First, it introduces 
the possibility that the post-accession FDI dynamic might be different for Western and Eastern 
Europe. FDI in Western European democracies became easier after these countries joined the EU 
but in the East countries had to in some ways satisfy stricter criteria after their accession. While 
the EU integration literature has established a definite positive and lasting effect of EU 
membership for Western European countries, there has been no systematic study evaluating the 
membership effect on CEE. Second, this article sheds more light on the question whether 
corruption matters for FDI. Although the consensus seems to be that it does, there are some 
dissenting voices. What my argument contributes to this debate is that different conditions may 
make corruption more or less salient of an issue for foreign investors. Finally, my arguments 
contribute to the literature on institutional signaling. Building on it I show how signaling 
progress and granting actual membership may have differential impact on investor confidence 
through first triggering psychological inferential shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, but 
then returning the levers of decision making to comprehensive rational analysis. 
                                                 
15
 This was the venue where “The Expendables 3” starring Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger, was shot. 
16
 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/business/international/bank-runs-in-bulgaria-expose-fragility-and-
flaws.html?_r=4 (accessed on July 26, 2014). 
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Appendix B: Variable measurement and Descriptive Statistics  
Table B.1: Variable Measurement  
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
The sum of all annual new FDI inflows in US Dollars at 2012 prices and 2012 
exchange rates in millions. An investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in 
an entity resident in an economy other than of the investor For associates and 
subsidiaries, FDI flows consist of the net sales of shares and loans (including non-
cash acquisitions made against equipment, manufacturing rights, etc.) to the 
parent company plus the parent firm´s share of the affiliate´s reinvested earnings 
plus total net intra-company loans (short- and long-term) provided by the parent 
company. For branches, FDI flows consist of the increase in reinvested earnings 
plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor. FDI flows 
with a negative sign (reverse flows) indicate that at least one of the components in 
the above definition is negative and not offset by positive amounts of the 
remaining components. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-
database.aspx, accessed in July 2014. 
EU Signaling Signaling dummies to the 12 Eastern Enlargement countries are assigned in 
accordance with the application stages they were in during the respective years in 
the dataset. A country receives a 1 for the “credible candidate” stage if it has 
signed an association agreement with the EU but has not yet entered accession 
negotiations; it receives a 0 otherwise. The “accession negotiations” dummy 
assigns a 1 to countries that have begun accession negotiations but have not yet 
signed a Treaty of Accession, and 0 otherwise. Source: Author. 
Corruption 
Control 
The Control of Corruption Index (one of the six World Governance Indicators 
(WGI)). The Control of Corruption Index is a composite governance indicator 
based on 32 underlying data sources.  These data sources are rescaled and 
combined to create an aggregate using an unobserved components model (UCM). 
The UCM assumes that the observed data from each source are a linear function 
of the unobserved level of governance, plus an error term.  This linear function is 
different for different data sources, and so corrects for the remaining non-
comparability of units of the rescaled data noted above.  The resulting estimates 
of governance are a weighted average of the data from each source, with weights 
reflecting the pattern of correlation among data sources.   The UCM assigns 
greater weight to data sources that tend to be more strongly correlated with each 
other.  While this weighting improves the statistical precision of the aggregate 
indicators, it typically does not affect very much the ranking of countries on the 
aggregate indicators.  The composite measures of corruption control generated by 
the UCM are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard 
deviation of one, and running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. The measure is useful as a tool for broad cross-
country comparisons and for evaluating broad trends over time. Source: World 
Bank: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, accessed in July 
2014.  
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Host Market 
Size 
Gross domestic product, current prices. Values are based upon GDP in national 
currency converted to U.S. dollars using market exchange rates (yearly average). 
Exchange rate projections are provided by country economists for the group of 
other emerging market and developing countries. Exchanges rates for advanced 
economies are established in the WEO assumptions for each WEO exercise. 
Expenditure-based GDP is total final expenditures at purchasers’ prices 
(including the f.o.b. value of exports of goods and services), less the f.o.b. value 
of imports of goods and services. Annual figures in billions of USD. Source: 
World Bank. 
Trade 
Openness 
Percent change in volume of imports of goods and services. Percent change of 
volume of imports refers to the aggregate change in the quantities of total imports 
whose characteristics are unchanged. The goods and services and their prices are 
held constant, therefore changes are due to changes in quantities only.  Source: 
World Bank. 
Inflation Inflation, average consumer prices. Expressed in averages for the year, not end-
of-period data. A consumer price index (CPI) measures changes in the prices of 
goods and services that households consume. Such changes affect the real 
purchasing power of consumers’ incomes and their welfare. As the prices of 
different goods and services do not all change at the same rate, a price index can 
only reflect their average movement. A price index is typically assigned a value 
of unity, or 100, in some reference period and the values of the index for other 
periods of time are intended to indicate the average proportionate, or percentage, 
change in prices from this price reference period. Price indices can also be used to 
measure differences in price levels between different cities, regions or countries at 
the same point in time. [CPI Manual 2004, Introduction] For euro countries, 
consumer prices are calculated based on harmonized prices. For more information 
see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-BE-04-001/EN/KS-
BE-04-001-EN.PDF.] Source: World Bank. 
Government 
Spending 
Government Expenditure as a percent of GDP. Total expenditure consists of total 
expense and the net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. Note: Apart from being on 
an accrual basis, total expenditure differs from the GFSM 1986 definition of total 
expenditure in the sense that it also takes the disposals of nonfinancial assets into 
account. Source: World Bank. 
Unit Labor 
Cost 
Gross average wages, denominated in US Dollars at current exchange rates. Gross 
average monthly wages cover total wages and salaries in cash and in kind, before 
any tax deduction and before social security contributions. They include wages 
and salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses and gratuities paid by the 
employer to the employee. For most countries wages cover total economy and are 
expressed per full-time equivalent employee. This enables comparison of 
different countries irrespective of the length of working time and the share of 
part-time and full-time workers.  
Source: UNECE Statistical Database: 
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/dialog/varval.asp?ma=60_MECCWagesY_r&path=../
database/STAT/20-ME/3 
MELF/&lang=1&ti=Gross+Average+Monthly+Wages+by+Country+and+Year, 
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accessed in July 2014.  
Foreign 
Reserves 
Total reserves (includes gold, current US Dollars). Source: World Bank.  
Structural 
Reforms 
Average of the six EBRD transition indicators: large scale privatization, small scale 
privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, price 
liberalization, and trade and forex reform. These have been used to track reform 
developments in all countries of operations since 1989. Progress is measured against the 
standards of industrialized market economies, while recognizing that there is neither a 
“pure” market economy nor a unique end-point for transition. The measurement scale for 
the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid 
centrally planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market 
economy. Source: EBRD: http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-
data/data/forecasts-macro-data-transition-indicators.html, accessed in July 2014. 
 
An additional measure of the extent of structural reforms is the Investment 
Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation. The index evaluates a variety of 
regulatory restrictions that are typically imposed on investment. Points are 
deducted from the ideal score of 100 for each of the restrictions found in a 
country’s investment regime. It is not necessary for a government to impose all of 
the listed restrictions at the maximum level to effectively eliminate investment 
freedom. Those few governments that impose so many restrictions that they total 
more than 100 points in deductions have had their scores set at zero. Investment 
restrictions are divided into seven categories: investment restrictions based on 
nationality, burdensome foreign investment code in terms of transparency and 
bureaucratic structures, restrictions on land ownership, various sectoral 
restrictions or barriers, commonality of expropriations of investment without due 
compensation, foreign exchange controls, capital controls in terms of instances of 
repatriation of profits or need for government approval for various transactions. 
The index relies on the following sources for data on capital flows and foreign 
investment, in order of priority: official government publications of each country; 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 2010–2013; Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, 2013 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, 2010–
2013. Source: The Heritage Foundation: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology, accessed in July 2014.  
The Financial 
Crisis 
A dummy variable for every country for every year measuring the presence a banking 
crisis. The variable comes from the Luc Leaven and Fabian Valencia (2012) dataset 
(Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update) which covers the universe of systemic 
banking crises for the period 1970-2011. The database includes all systemic banking, 
currency, and sovereign debt crises during the period 1970–2011. A banking crisis is 
defined as systemic if two conditions are met: 
1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by 
significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations) 
2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in 
the banking system. 
The first year of the crisis is the one when both criteria are met. Source: IMF: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26015.0, accessed in July 2014.  
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An additional control for the effects of the financial crisis on investment is global FDI. 
This is the sum of the FDI inflows in all countries in the world for every year in the 
dataset. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-database.aspx, accessed 
in July 2014.  
  
 
 
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure/Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI inflows 204 2,952.68                     3,899.84                     (652.50)                 23,560.76                     
Lagged FDI inflows 192 2,934.99                     3,887.08                     (652.50)                 23,560.76                     
Credible Candidate 204 0.17                             0.37                             -                         1.00                                
Accession Negotiations 204 0.25                             0.44                             -                         1.00                                
Corruption Control 192 0.41                             0.49                             (0.82)                     1.80                                
EBRD Structural Reforms 204 47.14                           5.81                             24.00                     54.00                             
Global FDI 204 1,106,143.00             471,895.50                391,439.30          2,002,695.00               
Trade Openness 200 8.05                             19.45                           (61.37)                   148.17                           
Unit Labor Cost 202 899.14                         684.66                         75.60                     3,078.70                       
Foreign Reserves 204 13,000,000,000.00  18,200,000,000.00  207,000,000.00  109,000,000,000.00  
Investment Freedom 204 66.67                           12.15                           30.00                     90.00                             
Host Market Size 204 48.32                           67.27                           0.53                       267.94                           
Inflation 204 181.93                         223.08                         14.35                     1,688.83                       
Government Spending 192 28.92                           13.31                           12.10                     82.08                             
Current Account Balance 204 4.44                             18.91                           (52.29)                   50.73                             
Financial Crisis 204 0.14                             0.35                             -                         1.00                                
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Appendix C: FDI Stock per Capita in the EU28  
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)  
 
 
 
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Luxembourg 84,701 126,027 158,864 132,312 171,589 273,874 245,322 319,968 308,586 343,854 232,385
Belgium 22,383 34,116 45,047 36,312 45,953 76,949 80,503 90,761 88,955 92,354 93,714
Ireland 46,470 55,563 50,823 39,329 37,027 47,465 43,257 56,685 63,889 55,609 65,092
Sweden 13,384 17,793 22,017 19,038 24,990 32,085 30,184 35,672 37,012 36,448 39,617
Malta 5,845 8,167 9,974 10,507 15,896 19,755 18,750 21,271 38,965 37,462 37,716
Netherlands 21,810 28,395 32,017 29,402 33,750 46,621 39,120 38,906 35,234 35,130 34,281
Denmark 15,417 18,607 21,594 21,486 24,581 29,736 28,101 28,384 25,919 25,982 26,404
Cyprus 6,783 9,374 11,532 11,191 17,841 23,165 21,023 23,020 21,600 25,690 26,016
United Kingdom 9,216 10,606 12,315 14,082 18,650 20,118 15,653 17,841 18,671 18,906 20,962
Austria 5,554 7,086 8,639 10,028 13,426 19,550 17,758 20,626 19,201 18,042 18,758
France 7,164 10,532 13,891 14,139 17,500 19,594 14,127 16,131 16,273 14,683 16,723
Finland 6,539 9,645 10,979 10,450 13,401 17,334 15,713 15,944 16,161 16,503 16,657
EU27 (European Union) 6,149 8,135 9,926 9,673 12,136 15,188 13,374 14,847 14,824 14,604 15,453
Estonia 3,119 5,188 7,449 8,380 9,450 12,482 12,209 12,531 12,449 12,478 14,052
Spain 6,216 8,079 9,536 8,861 10,485 13,135 13,044 13,853 13,637 13,391 13,567
Czech Republic 3,788 4,440 5,613 5,935 7,783 10,899 10,906 12,053 12,247 11,445 12,914
Portugal 4,282 5,789 6,374 6,007 8,363 10,870 9,400 10,764 10,462 10,461 10,950
Hungary 3,566 4,770 6,089 6,058 7,964 9,506 8,781 9,878 9,079 8,475 10,408
Slovakia 2,300 4,025 5,209 5,465 7,113 8,785 9,265 9,636 9,206 9,375 10,185
Germany 3,613 4,783 6,205 5,767 7,166 8,429 8,096 8,509 8,708 8,639 8,737
Slovenia 2,065 3,163 3,799 3,626 4,478 7,144 7,748 7,502 7,128 7,424 7,611
Croatia 1,360 1,930 2,790 3,275 6,173 10,180 6,992 8,299 7,944 7,022 7,205
Bulgaria 516 813 1,298 1,790 3,054 4,965 5,804 6,526 6,302 6,354 6,741
Poland 1,264 1,515 2,273 2,381 3,295 4,672 4,299 4,842 5,634 5,175 6,018
Latvia 1,171 1,404 1,953 2,138 3,260 4,752 5,080 5,131 4,774 5,391 5,931
Italy 2,343 3,252 3,978 4,048 5,289 6,328 5,475 6,049 5,418 5,581 5,854
Lithuania 1,150 1,439 1,862 2,404 3,236 4,457 3,854 3,956 3,993 4,313 4,798
Romania 356 557 938 1,186 2,094 2,909 3,146 3,343 3,270 3,328 3,468
Greece 1,405 2,021 2,555 2,610 3,680 4,728 3,376 3,717 3,083 2,561 3,310
